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life beneficiary. Such a decision would eradicate any element of
unlawful accumulation.
So run the opinions of the court. One who reads them is imme-
diately struck with the powerful arguments on both sides. Where
the Court of Appeals has disagreed by a four-to-three decision, there
is room for much debate. It seems to us that the majority of the
judges, influenced by considerations of justice in the abstract sense,
have seized upon this close case to initiate a possible departure from
previous well-defined rules of trust construction. While it is true
that in all of these cases discussed and noted, the settlor intended to
provide bounteously for his beneficiary, it is probably even more
true that he rarely desired that any sums left unexpended at the
death of the beneficiary should go to the heirs of the beneficiary
rather than the remainderman expressly designated by himself. This
is clearly manifested by the omnipresent clauses giving principal and
any surplus of income to remaindermen. By judicial construction
these provisions have been disregarded both as inconsistent with the
intent of the settlor where he provides generally for the maintenance
of the beneficiary and as violative of the statute against accumula-
tions. It is quite possible that the court does intend to correct this
situation. Certainly the vigorous and emphatic dissent more closely
accords with established principles of law. What the future may
bring is, bf course, a matter for conjecture. It does not seem at all
probable that the rule of the Hoyt case will be obliterated. It is
possible that it will be narrowed down. It will be interesting to
watch the effect of this decision upon the law of trusts.
MAX MILSTEIN.
MORTGAGES TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES.
Mortgages to secure future advances or liabilities are well recog-
nized and fully established. Their validity is no longer open to
question.1 Where a mortgage on its face states that it is to secure
future loans to a fixed amount, it is valid only up to that amount,2
and a collateral oral agreement to extend the mortgage to cover
future advances in excess of the limitation on the face of the instru-
'Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch 34 (U. S. 1812); Leeds v. Cameron, 3 Sumn.
488 (U. S. ) ; Fed. Cas. No. 8206 (1839) ; Truscott v. King, 6 N. Y. 147
(1852); Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380 (1860); Ackerman v. Hunsicker,
85 N. Y. 43, 39 Am. Rep. 621 (1881); Bank of Utica v. Finch, 3 Barb.(N. Y.) c. 293, 49 Am. Dec. 175 (1848); Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443
(1878); Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215 (1830); Straeffer v. Rodman, 146
Ky. 1, 141 S. W. 742 (1913); Newkirk v. Newkirk, 56 Mich. 525, 23 N. W.
206 (1885).
'Mowry v. Sanborn, 68 N. Y. 153 (1877) ; Ford v. Davis, 168 Mass. 116,
46 N. E. 435 (1897).
NOTES AND COMMENT
ment will not be upheld. A mortgage for future advances may be
made a continuing security for advances made at any time, so that
when advances have been made to the amount limited by the mort-
gage and these are paid, wholly or, in part, this mortgage is held to
continue as security for further loans within the prescribed limit.4
Such a mortgage has not been extended to secure loans made to a
partnership of which the mortgagor was a member.5
In a mortgage of this type, except for the fact that it secures
loans only within the prescribed limit, the consideration expressed
in the document is of little importance. In the case of Mil r v.
Lockwood 6 the consideration expressed was $25,000, although the
indebtedness at the date of the making of the mortgage contract
was only $13,700. The claim set forth was that the amount of the
mortgage being more than the actual consideration was proof of the
fraudulent intent of the parties as against the creditors of the mort-
gagor. The court agreed only in so far as it held this circumstance
to be a proper fact to be considered by the jury in determining the
bon o fides of the transaction, but held that it afforded no legal pre-
sumption of fraud since the instrument on its face was to cover not
only present but also future liabilities.
Mortgages to cover any or all future advances with no limit set
have been upheld as security for the real equitable claims of the
mortgagees whether they existed at the inception of the mortgage or
arose subsequently on the faith thereof.7 The amounts of the several
advances may be shown by extrinsic proof, for in such case the proof
does not contradict the mortgage or alter its legal operation and
effect in any way.8 In such case, when the mortgagee gets actual
notice of a subsequent lien, all further advances that he may make
are subordinated to the claim of the lienor.9 This is a just rule as
otherwise it is obvious that unscrupulous parties could prevent such
subsequent incumbrancers from ever realizing their claims on the
property by extending the mortgage to cover a sum equal to the
value of the property.
' Stoddard v. Hart, 23 N. Y. 556 (1861). But see contra: Stone v. Lane, 92
Mass. 74 (1865).
'United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 2 L. ed. 370 (U. S. 1805) ; Robinson
v. Williams, supra note 1; Brown v. Kiefer, 71 N. Y. 610 (1877); Commercial
Bank of Rochester v. Weinberg, 70 Hun 597, 25 N. Y. Supp. 235 (N. Y.
1893); Shores v. Doherty, 65 Wis. 153, 26 N. W. 577 (1886).
'Bank of Buffalo v. Thompson, 121 N. Y. 280, 24 N. E. 473 (1890) ; Bank
of Batavia v. Tarbox, 38 Hun 57 (N. Y. 1885).
032 N. Y. 293 (1865); see also Mowry v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 138 N. Y.
642 (1893).
'Shirras v. Caig, Robinson v. Williams, both supra note 1.
' Hall v. Crouse, 13 Hun 557 (N. Y. 1878).
'Robinson v. Williams, supra note 1; Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252
(1861).
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The fact that the mortgage fails to disclose that it proposes to
secure future advances will not militate against its validity, 10 although
in such case there is great ground for suspicion and the mortgagee is
required to prove consideration by more strict proof than would be
otherwise necessary.'1 Parol testimony as to the intent of the par-
ties is admissible as between themselves 12 and against those subse-
quent lienors who are notified when their liens attached as to the
purpose of the mortgage.13
Under the New York Recording Act, 14 it is necessary as against
subsequent encumbrancers for value for mortgages to be recorded.15
Thus a mortgage for future advances that was first reqorded was
given preference over a prior unrecorded purchase money mortgage
as to all advances made prior to receiving notice of this mortgage.' 6
It is the general practice to record this mortgage before any actual
indebtedness occurs,17 since although it does not become an actual
lien till some debt or liability secured by it is created,' 8 and then
only to the extent of such debt or liability,19 it is considered a poten-
tial lien for the entire amount of the contracted-for indebtedness. 20
This places all subsequent lienors upon inquiry to determine just
what advances, if any, have been made and enables them by giving
notice to prevent any further advances being made to their preju-
dice. 21  The notice required is actual notice 22 as the courts have
construed the recording acts to be prospective and not retrospective
in action. The authorities proceed upon the theory that the mort-
gage, as against subsequent incumbrances, becomes a lien for the
whole sum advanced as of the date of its execution and recordation.
There is slight authority that tends toward the rule that constructive
notice will suffice, but the great weight of authority is otherwise.
10 Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sandf. at c. 76 (N. Y. 1844); Bank of Uticd v.
Finch, supra note 1; Hall v. Crouse, supra note 8; Tully v. Harloe, 35 Cal.
302, 95 Am. Dec. 102 (1868); Westheimer v. Goodkind, 24 Mont. 90, 60 Pac.
813 (1900); Schofield Implement Co. v. Minot Farmers' Grain Assn., 31 N. D.
605, 154 N. W. 527 (1915); Blackmar v. Sharp, 23 R. I. 412, 50 Atl. 852
(1901) ; Moses v. Hatfield, 27 S. C.324, 3 S. E. 538 (1887).
" Craig v. Tappin, supra note 10.
.McKinster v. Babcock, 26 N. Y. 378 (1863) ; Cady v. Merchants Bank,
47 Hun 631 (N. Y. 1888), aff'd without opinion, 113 N. Y. 657, 21 N. E. 415
(1889).
Cady v. Merchants Bank, supra note 12.14 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1909) §291.1 Ibid.
Reynolds v. Webster, 71 Hun 378, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1133 (N. Y. 1893).
Truscott v. King, Robinson v. Williams, both supra note 1.18Frentel v. Schmitz, 299 Ill. 320, 132 N. E. 534 (1921).
Dart v. McAdam, 27 Barb. 187 (N. Y. 1858); Freeman v. Auld, 44 Barb.
14 (N, Y. 1865) ; Watts v. Bonner, 66 Miss. 629, 6 So. 187 (1889) ; Schaemer
v. Zeran, 126 Wash. 219, 217 Pac. 1009 (1923).
. Ackerman v. Hunsicker,. supra note 1.
'Ibid.; supra note 17.
' Truscott v. King, Robinson v. Williams, Ackerman v. Hunsicker, all
supra note 1; Creigh v. Jones, 103 Neb. 706, 173 N. W. 687 (1919) ; Central
Trust Co. v. Continental Iron Works, 51 N. J. Eq. 605, 28 Atl. 595 (1894).
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If the logic behind the doctrine should appear to be specious, the
necessity for expediency and safety in business transactions more
than justifies the rule.
The New York Court of Appeals declared that the instrument
should state the requisite facts as to the extent and certainty of the
contract so that a junior creditor or a prospective purchaser might
have notice of the extent of the incumbrance. 23 As far as this state
is concerned, it can be seen that this statement describes the etiquette
of the situation rather than the law. As a matter of law, it is unnec-
cessary for the instrument to do more than apprise a junior creditor
or would-be purchaser that there is a prior lien in existence, putting
him on inquiry as to the extent and character of the lien.24 The
requirements of some jurisdictions make it necessary that the extent
of the lien be limited in some manner.2 5  Others follow the New
York rule, holding that there is no necessity for limiting the amount
of the intended advances in any way, if the mortgage shows that it
is to cover future advances.2 6
A problem which arises frequently and has caused great diver-
sity of opinion among courts and law writers, is where subsequent
lienors of the mortgaged premises deny that the prior mortgage lien
properly embraces advances made subsequently to the attaching of
their liens. Mortgages for future advances fall into two categories:
the so-called optional 27 and obligatory 28 mortgages. The words are
descriptive of the character of the advances to be made.
Where the contract makes it obligatory for the mortgagee to
make the advances in any event, his lien is held superior to any
subsequent lien whether or not he has actual or constructive notice
Truscott v. King, supra note 1.
a Robinson v. Williams, supra note 1.
'DuBois v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 Pac. 169 (1908); Benton
Shingles Co. v. Mills, 13 Ga. App. 632, 79 S. E. 755 (1913).
Several states have statutory provisions requiring the debt secured to be
described in the mortgage, which restrict the right to make mortgages for
future advances. Georgia (Civ. Code 1926, #3257); Maryland (Ann. Code
1924, Art. 66, #2); New Hampshire (Public Stats. of N. H., 1926, c. 215,
#3. In the two latter states the statutes necessitate the limiting of the mort-
gage by some definite means. Georgia requires only that the instrument point
out some means for determining the amount of the debt.
Lovelace v. Webb, 62 Ala. 271 (1878) ; Topia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383,
19 Pac. 641 (1888); Cazort & Co. v. Dunbar, 91 Ark. 400, 121 S. W. 270
(1909).
"Ackerman v. Hunsicker, supra note 1; Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N. Y. 48,
33 N. E. 735 (1893) ; Schmidt v. Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 N. E. 335 (1897) ;
Anderson v. Liston, 69 Minn. 82, 72 N. W. 52 (1897); Omaha Coal Co. v.
Suess, 54 Neb. 379, 74 N. W. 620 (1898) ; Home Savings Assn. v. Burton, 20
Wash. 688, 56 Pac. 940 (1899).
'Ackerman v. Hunsicker, supra note 1; Hyman v. Huaff, supra note 27;
Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal. App. 149, 186 Pac. 831 (1919); Boswell v. Good-
win, 31 Conn. 74, 81 Am. Dec. 169 (1862) ; Schmidt v. Zahrndt, supra note 27;
Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494, 71 Am. Dec. 645 (1859); Commercial Bank v.
Cunningham, 41 Mass. 270, 35 Am. Dec. 322 (1837); Kuhn v. Southern Ohio
Loan & Trust Co., 101 Ohio 34, 126 N. E. 820, aff'g, 12 Ohio App. 184 (1920).
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of the attaching of such lien.29 It would be manifestly inequitable
to prefer the intervening creditor when, if the mortgagee, to protect
himself, ceased his payments, he would be held liable to the mort-
gagor for breach of contract.30 The theory relied upon to protect
the mortgagee is that each payment relates back to the date of the
mortgage. The only exception to this rule would occur under the
recording acts of the various states in the case where a subsequent
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the prior claim
first recorded his instrument. In this instance, the mortgage first
in time is nevertheless subordinated in its entirety.
31
In the mortgage for future optional advances, the liability for
breach of contract is non-existent 2 and a different problem ensues.
In England, it was first held that a mortgage securing future optional
advances had priority not only for advances made prior to the execu-
tion of a second mortgage, but also for advances made by the mort-
gagee after actual notice of the second mortgage.33 This doctrine,
in so far as it allowed the mortgagee priority for advances made
after receiving notice of the second mortgage, was overruled, but
was reaffirmed in that the mortgagee for future advances was pro-
tected as to loans made without notice of the second mortgage and
in this form is the law in England today.34 This latter rule was
adopted in the American courts and it is unquestionably the law
today that as to all advances made prior to receiving notice of the
intervening lien, even though such advances .be made subsequently
to the attaching of the lien, the mortgagee under the mortgage for
future optional advances is granted priority.35 As to advances made
subsequent to receiving actual notice of the intervening lien the
weight of authority grants priority to the intervening lienor.36
A differentiation has been made in New York between a mort-
gage to secure purely optional or voluntary advances and one which
by its terms gives the mortgagee an option to cease payments on the
occurrence of a certain event.37 Where the contract gave the mort-
gagee the right to cease delivery of materials and payments in case
any lien or encumbrance should be docketed against, filed, or placed
upon the property during the performance of the contract and the
contingency provided against occurred but the lender failed to exer-
cise his option and continued performance of the contract, the New
" Ibid.
10 Ibid.
' For effect of Recording Acts of various jurisdictions see 1 JONES,
MORTGAGES, (8th ed. 1928) c. 12
' Supra note 18.
' Gordon v. Graham, 7 Vin. Abr. 52, pl. 3, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598 (1716).
Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Cas. 514 (1861).
' Shirras v. Caig, Ackerman v. Hunsicker, both supra note 1; Hyman v.
Hauff, Schmidt v. Zahrndt, both supra note 27; Union Nat. Bank v. Milburn
& Co., 7 N. D. 201, 73 N. W. 527 (1897); McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300,
42 Am. Dec. 512 (1844).
Ibid.
' Hyman v. Hauff, supra note 27, at 54.
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York Court of Appeals nevertheless gave him preference as to all
advances made, including those made after receipt of notice of the
intervening mortgages.3 8 The ruling was predicated on two reasons:
that where a party to a contract waves a stipulation in his favor, a
stranger to the contract cannot "derive and benefit or raise any
question based upon a fact that no way concerned him"; and that
since the intervening encumbrancer obtains no priority where the
mortgagee subjects himself to damages by declining to perform or
make the advances, there is no reason why he should be granted
priority in a case "where the loss of the profits or fruits of the
contract must follow a failure or omission to perform". A close
analysis will show that the differentiation is arbitrary rather than
logical. The subsequent mortgagees in this case are no more stran-
gers to the contract than are the mortgagees in the purely optional
mortgages, where they are given a priority. Where the mortgage is
purely optional and the mortgagee ceases payments because of an
intervening lien, he also suffers "loss of the profits or fruits of the
contract" inasmuch as he must forego part of his intended invest-
ment. It was said that the contract was obligatory till the option
was exercised. It would be a truer statement to say that it was
obligatory till the mortgagee received notice of the subsequent liens,
since, in that event, the mortgagee would no longer be subject to
suit for breach of contract if he fails to continue his payments. This
liability is the basis for the differentiation between obligatory and
optional mortgages and, on the occurrence of the event, this liability
disappears. By virtue of this decision, the New York court has
taken a step back towards the rule as first expressed in England.3 9
Mississippi adopted the old English rule without any varia-
tions.40 Whether or not the mortgage is obligatory or optional, with
or without notice of the intervening lien, the mortgage is preferred
in its entirety where the subsequent encumbrancer has notice, actual
or constructive, of the prior lien, and such notice gives the super-
vening encumbrancer information as to the extent of the prior
mortgage.
Unquestionably, such a ruling simplifies the entire problem of
priorities in this type of mortgage. The theory underlying such a
doctrine is that since the secondary lienor has knowledge as to just
what extent the property is mortgaged, he should not expect to be
given priority as to any part of that mortgage. Since the trend in
law is theoretically towards simplification, the adoption of this rule
with the additional safeguard of a statute similar in effect to that of
Maryland, New Hampshire, or Georgia 41 to insure unambiguous
'31d. at 5-6.
'Supra note 33.
"Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876); Gray v. Helm. 60 Miss.
131 (1882), quoted and followed in Lovelace v. Webb, supra note 26.
"Supra note 25.
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language in describing the lien and thus providing ample protection
against fraud would be a great step forward.
JULIEN D. GOELL.
RECEIVER OF RENTS AND PROFITS IN NEW YORK.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeals in the Holmes v.
Gravenhorst case ' has brought a solution to the problem as to
whether, upon the appointment of a receiver in an action brought
to foreclose a mortgage containing the covenant: "That the holder
of said mortgage, in any action to foreclose it, shall be entitled
(without notice and without regard to the adequacy of any security
for the debt) to the appointment of a receiver of the rents and
profits of said premises," a mortgagor-owner may be required to
pay rent to the receiver or be evicted from the premises prior to
a sale under a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
Tracing the recent New York decisions 2 our attention is brought
to the conflicting interests of the mortgagor, 3 lessee, and mortgagee,
exhibiting the forceful influences exerted by them to control the
powers of the receiver of rents and profits pending foreclosure. 4
The issue arises most often between the mortgagee and lessee, con-
cerning the handling of leases in existence during the period of
receivership. "Confronted by a debtor who has defaulted and a
security which is probably inadequate, the mortgagee is concerned
with the making of the receiver's right to the rents and profits of
the mortgaged premises productive of an amount sufficient to offset
the contemplated deficiency. 5 However, leases made by the mort-
gagor prior to the foreclosure action may not provide for an adequate
'238 App. Div. 313, 263 N. Y. Supp. 738 (2d Dept. 1933).
'See (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 168. The discussion herein will be confined
to New York as the only jurisdiction in which the more complex aspects of
this problem have been litigated to any appreciable degree.
' Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "landlord" and "mortgagor" will be
used to dominate the owner of the equity of redemption at the time of fore-
closure, although in cases of assignments subsequent to the execution of the
mortgage these parties may have different interests and may be different persons.
'Under §254 subd. 10 of N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW, where the mortgagee
may have a receiver appointed on default. Heretofore, the rights to the exer-
cise of judicial discretion were unhampered, although it has, at times, been
held to be "a contract right." Butler v. Frazer, 57 N. Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct.
1896). In the absence of express provision in the mortgage, a receiver will be
appointed upon application by the mortgagee, after the institution of fore-
closure proceedings, only where the mortgagor is insolvent and the security
inadequate. See Finch v. Ray, 208 App. Div. 251, 255, 203 N. Y. Supp. 560,
562 (3rd Dept. 1924). However, cf. Cohen v. Bartlett, 182 App. Div. 245,
169 N. Y. Supp. 604 (1st Dept. 1918) insolvency was not required.
See (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1212.
